3/13/2019

BOEINGS ''SOFTWARE UPDATES'' TRAGEDIES


IT now seems that a trail of decisions kept the crew of a doomed Lion Air Flight and Ethiopian Airline flight in the dark.

IN the brutally competitive jetliner business, the announcement in late 2010 that Airbus would introduce a more fuel-efficient version of its best-selling A320 amounted to a frontal attack on its arch rival Boeing's workhorse 737.

Boeing scrambled to counterpunch. Within months, it came up with a pan for an upgrade of its own, the 737 Max, featuring engines that would yield similar fuel savings.

And in the years that followed, Boeing pushed  not just to design and build the new plane, but to persuade its airline customers and, crucially, that the new model would fly safely and handle enough like the existing model that 737 pilots would not have to undergo costly retraining.

Boeing's strategy set off a cascading series of engineering, business and regulatory decisions that years later would leave the company facing difficult questions about the crash of a Lion Air 737 Max off Indonesia.

The causes of the crash, which killed 189 people, are still under investigation. The Indonesian authorities are studying the cockpit voice recorder for insights into how the pilots handled the emergency, and are examining Lion Air's long history of maintenance problems.

But the tragedy has become a focus off intense interest and debate in aviation circles because of another factor : the determination by Boeing and the F.A.A. that pilots did not need to be informed about a change introduced in the 737s flight control system for the Max, some-

Some  software coding intended to automatically  offset the risk that the size and location of the new engines could lead the aircraft to stall under certain conditions.

That judgment  by Boeing and its regulators was at least in part a result of the company's drive to minimize the costs of  pilot  retraining.

And it appears to have left the Lion Air Crew and The Ethiopian Airlines crew without a  full understanding of how to address a malfunction that seems to have contributed to the crash :

Faulty data erroneously indicating that the plane was flying at a dangerous angle, leading the flying control system to push the plane's nose down.

The World Students Society thanks author and researchers James Glanz, Julie Creswell, Thomas Kaplan, and Zach Wichter.

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